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1. Introduction 
Capitalism has turned out to be a much more robust economic System 
than most of its socialist and conservative critics in the nineteenth 
Century have forecast. It has, of course, changed substantially: labour 
relations, the röle of government, the distribution of income are quite 
different now from what they were, say, 110 years ago, the publication 
date of volume I of "Das Kapital". But, inspite of "Mitbestimmung" in 
Germany, one thing has remained remarkably stable in the Western 
world: the formal authority of decision making in the firm rests with the 
"owners", i.e. those persons who provide the risk bearing capital. It is 
claimed by critics that this arrangement within the factory and the firm 
prevents working conditions which are in accordance with human needs 
for involvement, participation, self-esteem, free Cooperation among 
equals, etc.
1. Traditional economies has three possible answers to this 
criticism: 1. It is empirically false to say that in present day capitalism 
these needs cannot bc fulfilled. They can be fulfilled and are fulfilled. 
2. The critics exaggerate these needs. To the extent that work relations 
are not in accordance to these needs this is due to a lacking willingness 
to pay for having these needs fulfilled
2. 3. This criticism is basically 
correct and herc wc encounter an important case of market failure which 
needs detailed investigation. Which of these answers is correct, is mainly 
1 There is, of course, a vast literature on this point. See for example P. 
Blumberg, Alicnation and Participation: Conclusions, in J.Vanek (ed.), Seif 
Management: Economic Liberation of Man, Harmondsworth 1975, pp. 324-
338, and other articles in Vanek (ed.), op. cit. 
2 E.G.Dohm, Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 79 (1971), pp. 1090-1092, explains and critisises 
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an empirical question. We do not want to commit ourselves to one of the 
three answers. But, we do not see any strong reason to exclude answer 
no. 3 and this is why we want to contribute to the theory of labour managed 
firms. A system of labour managed firms combines the principle of decen-
tralization via markets with a decision strueture, which supposedly is 
more appropriate for nonauthoritarian, partieipatory labour relations. 
Economists have taken up this topic recently in increasing numbers. 
One of the topics which has drawn specific attention is the problem of 
financing labour managed firms. This problem is intrinsically difficult 
due to its inseparability from the problem of risk and moral hazard. We 
first proeeed to consider in turn four different modes of financing. We 
then try to discuss the issue from a somewhat more fundamental view-
point. 
2. Mode no. 1: Internal Financing 
Vanek has argued convincingly that internal financing will lead to 
extremely restrictive investment behaviour of a labour managed firm
3. 
If a voting member of the firm expects to leave the firm at some date in 
the future, he is only interested in the benefits of the investment accuring 
before he leaves. But even if he were not to leave and would live forever 
he creates an extemality to those future colleagues who do not share in 
the bürden of foregoing present consumption (because they arrive after 
the investment) but who benefit from the investment. Thus, unless the 
members of the fiim remain identical for the whole lifetime of the firm, 
future benefits are collectively discounted more than corresponding to 
the personal preferences of the individuals making the decisions. We may 
call this problem the "wpward blas in time preference of collective deci-
sions". It is, of course, a phenomenon encountered in other circumstances, 
too. Take the case of political decisions on the communal or town level 
in a system of fiscal federalism. If people are rather mobile they will 
prefer decisions reflecting high rates of time preference, because they will 
be affected only as long as they live in the Community
4. 
The time preference bias has another interesting implication for labour 
managed firms. It leads to a suboptimal firm size. For one way to avoid 
Investments is not to expand manpower. A firm with a high rate of time 
3 See J. Vanek, The Basic Theory of Financing of Partieipatory Firms, in: 
Vanek (ed.), op. cit., pp. 448-449, and A.B.Atkinson, Worker Management 
and the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 
87 (1973), p. 383. 
4 This is different, if they own property in the Community, which they seil 
when they move. The logical consequence would be to restrict voting rights 
to property owners in towns and other local communitics, a system which 
was widespread in Europe before the introduetion of general equal suffrage. 
For obvious reasons we should not aim for the restoration of such a system. 
But the historical developments in regard to participation in political deci-
sions might perhaps be indicative of future development of workers partici-
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preference will therefore ceteris paribus be smaller than a firm with a low 
rate of time preference. 
If Y = F (K, N) is the production function of the firm and if, in equi-
librium, the firm maintains its capital stock through time, then the margi-
nal productivity of capital FK is just equal to the rate of time preference, 
g. The firm will adapt employment to the level where Output per worker 
is maximized, i.e. where 
JF 
*ü NFN - F 
3N
 = N> = °
 O
R 
where the elasticity of production with respect to labour equals unity: 
NFN 
F 
At the equilibrium point substantial economies of scale prevail. 
The scale elasticity of Output is 
FN • N , FK • K QK 
F ~t~ F
 + F 
and hence much above unity. The equilibrium firm size is below the 
Optimum size. Let us call this the firm size bias of collective decisions. 
3. Mode no. 2: Fixed Interest External Financing 
Vanek argues that a labour managed economy needs a banking system 
which provides external financing in a generous fashion so as to avoid the 
problem of seif financing just discussed
5. It is trae that the time prefe-
rence bias and the firm size bias could in principle be avoided, if the 
firm were completely externally financed. Then income of workers would 
be equal to the residual from value added after subtraction of interest 
payments. The marginal productivity of capital would be equal to the 
interest rate (which supposedly can be considered to reflect prefcrences 
and opportunities involved in Society's intertemporal decisions). The 
residual income for workers (r = interest rate) 
F (K, N) rK 
is maximized when 
5 Vanek argues that the competitive domination of labour managed firms 
by privately owned firms can be explained by the fact that labour managed 
firms were compelled to finance themselves internally, see Vanek, op. cit., 
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and 
dw_ _ NFN — {F — riq 
8N ~ iV* 
= 0 or 
F — rK 
N 
= Fjsr or w  FN 
so that the scale elasticity is 
FNN FKK F — FKK  FKK 
= 1 
FF F  F 
Hence the optimum firm size is attained. 
But the problem with fixed interest financing is twofold. If it worked 
in the manner described, then there would be no risk-sharing between 
the firm and the rest of the economy. All the risk would have to be borne 
by the workers of the firm. This is the risk bearing problem. It arises to 
some degree also in capitalism. But in addition the system cannot work 
that way. The banks must take precaution not to loose money on bad 
risks and not to be cheated by borrowers. Again similar problems arise 
in a capitalist environment. Implicitly banks who lend money get invol-
ved in the investment decisions of potential and actual borrowers, if they 
want to distinguish between good and bad risks. This runs against the 
principle of decentralized decision making. We may thus call this the 
incomplete decentralization problem. In addition, the possibility of bank-
ruptcy causes a moral hazard problem. Borrowers may be lacking effort 
to operate successfully if in risky situations substantial parts of the losses 
can be gol rid off b}^ bankruptcy. This problem may be much more severe 
for a labour managed firm than for a capitalist firm. Decision makers in 
the labour managed firm are likely to run away after bad luck has hit 
the firm: the probability of leaving a firm is correlated with the business 
condition of the firm. A highly profitable firm will suffer fewcr diopouts 
of decision makers than an unprofitable one. Thus the rationality of 
decisions in a firm deteriorates as its profitability deteriorates. Therefore 
lending to a firm of yet unknown future profitability may be much more 
risky in a labour managed system than in a capitalist system. 
Fixed interest external financing is possible wherever the lender obtains 
a collateral like a mortgage against his loan. Thus equipment which keeps 
in value even outside of the production process, in which it is now used, 
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4. Mode no. 3: External Financing by Nonvoting Shares 
This mode of financing has been proposed by Nutzinger as an answer 
to the problem posed by fixed interest financing
6. People providing 
capital to a labour managed firm receive dividends in proportion to the 
incomes paid to the workers, or, to generalize the proposal, in proportion 
to a function of incomes paid to the workers. 
The proposal has a certain similarity to share-ciopping arrangements 
which have been used and still are used in many parts of the world. The 
risk is divided between the worker (or the tenant in the share-cropping 
case) and the financier (or the land owner in the share-cropping case). Its 
attractions are the explicit Separation of decision making authority and 
parts of the risk beaiing function. But, whenever this Separation occurs, 
certain control schemes are necessary. There is always the danger that 
decision makers in such a Situation work against the interest of risk 
bearing nondecision makers. On the other hand, under certain circum-
stances such schemes work quite well. After all, the small shareholder 
of the large capitalist public Company does not participate in the decision 
making process either. But the evaluation of the Performance of the 
management by the stock market together with certain additional 
auditing instrumenta make the Separation of ownership and control the 
predominant and a very effective set-up for running large commercial 
Operations. Very large risks indeed can be absorbed this way. 
If the method of farming the land has a substantial impact upon the 
value of the land, share-cropping is not viable except for the case that 
the tenant can be tied down to the land for a long period of time. Simi-
larly provision of risk bearing capital can only work in a labour managed 
environment, if the decision makers accept certain limits of their autho-
rity
7. Nonvoting shareholders must have some access to the books of the 
firm. The firm cannot be allowed to pay out to the workers more than is 
really earned. Otherwise, rather than operating some productive activity, 
it could take the money provided by the nonvoting shareholders, distri-
6 H. G. Nutzinger, Die Stellung des Betriebes in der sozialistischen Wirt-
schaft, Frankfurt und New York 1974, pp. 285-287. 
7 They cannot be allowed, for instance, to determine the capital intensity 
freely for a givcn araount of capital. Else it will pay to reducc employrnent 
and increase the capital intensity continuously, since this will increase labour 
productivity and per capita earnings. Capital productivity, however, will be 
rcduced thercby, and this will reduce the income of the shareholders if it is 
tied to the sum of the incomes the workers receive. This difficulty arises from 
the fact that the target of the workers is per capita income, whereas the 
shareholders will be interested in total income. This remains true if the market 
valuation of shares is taken into aecount: In contrast to the shareholders, 
the workers will always be interested in per-capita targets like the present 
value of the firm per head - a point which ought to be added to Nutzinger's 
argument, see Nutzinger, op. cit., p. 286. 
This difficulty can be remedied, however, if the income of the shares is 
tied directly to the target the workers pursue: If e.g. the income of one share 
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bute it according to the formula agreed upon, and dissolve itself. Rules 
that prevent this are easily devised, but some external auditing for the 
benefit of the nonvoting shareholders is necessary. 
But in addition, it remains, of course, true that the particular moral 
hazard problem of labour managed firms remains. The potential non-
voting shareholder must be afraid to give money to a firm which has less 
than average profitability. For he must be afraid that people are thinking 
of leaving this firm and that therefore their decisions are very short-
sighted. Should he invest his money under such conditions in this firm ? 
If at all then only by asking for much higher share in income paid out, 
which in itself increases the incentive of workers to leave the firm. On the 
other hand profitable firms with a low rate of outward labour mobility 
will, of course, have an easy time finding additional financing by issuing 
nonvoting shares. 
5. Mode no. 4: Leasing 
Leasing of equipment is well known in capitalist economies. Leasing 
with a fixed rental payment per year has the advantage over purchasing 
that it is the supplier's rather than the user's credit potential which is 
used. To the extent that the supplier is considered a better risk by the 
banks the net effect of leasing on investment activity in the economy is 
positive. Moreover, leasing could be combined with risk sharing of the 
lessor, if the lessor would agree to receive payment in proportion to some 
function of income payments to the workers
8. Leasing thus can serve an 
auxiliary function to external financing, but it is obviously limited to the 
financing of capital embodied in pieces of equipment, whose properties 
lend themselves to leasing. 
In industries which are characterized by very capital intensive pro-
duction methods leasing might play a particular röle. The total equipment 
might be owned by a single external financier (the government?) con-
tracting it out to a labour managed firm on a risk sharing basis. The 
financier here is much more involved in the decision process since any 
decision involving a change of equipment has to be taken jointly with 
him. Thus in this case leasing would be a form of external financing which 
limits the decision making autonomy of the worker managed firm sub-
stantially. 
It should be noted that the actual Yugoslav system has characteristics 
of some similarity to the leasing system. 
6. The Commitment Mechanism in Capitalism 
In this second part of the paper we want to discuss what we think is 
the common denominator of the different problems encountered in 
financing labour managed firms. We call it the commitment problem. 
8 To avoid the difficulty mentioned in the foregoing footnote, the income 
could be tied to average per capita income, however. Risk Financing in Labour Managed Economies  59 
Decision makers of an Organisation only tend to make rational decisions 
for their Organisation, if they are personally committed to share the 
consequences of these decisions. An Organisation can only hope to get 
risk-sharing support from outside, if these potential outside supporters 
believe that good decisions are being taken within the Organisation. They 
will therefore insist to see what the specific commitment mechanism for 
the organisation's decision makers is. We therefore have to discuss the 
commitment mechanisms in labour managed economies. 
Since we are concerned with the financing of labour managed firms we 
concentrate on the intertemporal dimension of decisions. Let us look at 
the commitment mechanisms available to capitalist firms. The share-
holders, who form the ultimate decision body in the enterprise, do not 
have to remain shareholders in order to make appropriate investment 
decisions. This is so, because they are interested in the long run profit-
ability of the firm, even if they seil the shares tomorrow. They obtain a 
higher price for their shares if the profitability prospects of the firm are 
better. The true commitment mechanism is not the immobility of the 
shareholder's person. It is the commitment of the shareholder's capital 
to the Company, the inability to get this capital back before the other 
shareholders get their's back. Similarly the owner of a house in a Com-
munity is interested in the long run rationality of Community decisions 
even if it is likely that he will move out shortly. It is his immovable 
property by which he is committed to the Community. Thus commitment 
is possible without personal immobility by the Institution of transferable 
property rights. 
A different commitment mechanism is used in capitalism for top 
management of large companies. The decision makers of these firms 1. get 
paid in a way which makes them interested in maximizing actual profits 
and future profitability prospects of the firm (profit related bonuses, 
stock options etc.), 2. are part of a job market whose main Performance 
criterion again is present value of profits of the companies (or divisions 
of companies) which they run, and 3. derive their social prestige and self-
esteem again from successes measured by similar criteria. Now, it is im-
portant to realize that profit here is an indirect criterion: it is not con-
sumption of shareholders. It is a balance sheet coneept and at any given 
time there can be differences of opinion about the profitability of the 
firm in question. Here lies a substantial source of error and it is not true, 
therefore, that top management is committed to the maximization of 
expected long run profitability of the Company. There will be a bias 
towards those components of long run profitability which are more easily 
reflected in short run Signals of long run profitability, such as operating 
profit of the current year (this bias may be partly or completely com-
pensated or over-compensated by the tax laws). There will also be a bias 
against risky activities, because by the very nature of Performance 
measurement under imcomplete Information, managers cannot spread 
the risks of decision for which they are responsible
9. One important 
The members of labour managed firms face a similar problem. Due to 60  E. Schlicht and C. C. von Weizsäcker 
ingredient of the commitment mechanism when authority is delegated 
to appointed managers is the prospect or expectation of a long term of 
office. The manager only then will reckon that his Performance will be 
evaluated not only by short-term results. It must be a mistake (or a 
sign that authority has not been delegated) if the board changes top 
management too frequently. 
7. Tradeable Job Rights as Answer to the 
Commitment Problem 
Applying these ideas to a system of labour managed firms we arrive 
at a scheme which in itself probably is not very attractive to socialist 
advocates of labour managed firms: the separability or transferability 
of job rights. Before we describe this system, let us stress that we do not 
think this to be a realistic scheme, partly for reasons given later, partly 
for reasons not discussed in this paper. We discuss the scheme simply to 
discover the logical structure of the commitment problem with which 
we are concerned. 
Jobs in such a system would be bought by workers from other workers 
or from firms expanding the number of Jobs. Assuming that the labour 
force is homogeneous in terms of skills and other characteristics impor-
tant for Cooperation in the firm, a free trade in Jobs of any given firm 
could take place. These tradable job rights are the precise analogue of 
tradable shares in a capitalist environment. They combine maximum 
personal mobility with a Solution to the commitment problem. Holders 
of job rights will make decisions in accordance with the long run interest 
of the firm, because they want to maximize the present market value 
of their tradable job rights. 
We mentioned earlier that profitability differences of firms tend to 
become accentuated due to the negative correlation of outward mobility 
and profitability. This problem no longer arises here (except in extreme 
cases of near bankruptcy). Job rights of less profitable firms will have 
a lower market value. Indeed, the market values of job rights of different 
firms reflect the different propensities to move from one firm to the other, 
and in equilibrium the representative buyer of a job right is indifferent 
between an expensive one and a cheap one. Given these circumstances 
the specific labour management induced bias of the financiers towards 
profitable firms disappears. Those biases that may still remain are to be 
explained along similar lines on those that may exist under capitalism. 
8. Immobility as a Commitment Mechanism 
Apart from obvious problems of equity (which could partly be mended 
by appropriate modifications) the system is not feasible, because job 
the "risky shift" phenomenon, however, which arises in. group decisions, risk 
aversion of the labour managed firm might be smaller; see P.R.Hof stätter, 
Gruppendynamik, 2nd ed., Hamburg 1957, pp. 123-127. Risk Financing in Labour Managed Economies  61 
rights arc of a nature different from dividend shares in large capitalist 
companies. Job rights are obviously also job obligations. There is no 
such thing as absentee job ownership (except in certain latter day capita-
list Systems where up to a point you are protected legally or de facto from 
dismissal even if you don't care to show up at work). These job obligations 
require Cooperation with others and these others need to protect their 
interests by participating in the decision about membership in the firm. 
A labour managed firm, even a large one, is thus closer in nature to a 
business partnership than to its larger younger cousin, the public Joint 
stock Company. But a property right, which only can be sold with the 
consent of a large group of people, implies incomplete separability of 
person and property right. True, it is in the interest of all partners, i.e. 
of all holders of such property rights, to make transferability comparati-
vely easy. But there are obvious conflicts of interest, e. g. between old 
workers (who are interested in a maximum present market value of the 
property right) and young (who want to maintain control over the selec-
tion of colle&gues with whom they may have to work for decades). Limi-
tations of transferability are therefore to be expected and they will have 
the consequence of reducing mobility between firms. There will exist a 
premium of staying where you are, even if Job rights can in principle pass 
from one person to another. 
The way in which the commitment problem will be solved in the labour 
managed market economy therefore is by a sufficient de facto immobility 
of labour between firms. The sources of this immobility can be quite 
different. It is only important that workers in their decisions reckon 
with this immobility and that outside financiers reckon with the fact 
that workers reckon with this immobility. 
There can be too much or too little mobility from the point of view of 
national collective decisions. In the absence of transferable job rights or 
dividend rights the discounting bias factor going into the voting decision 
of individual firm members is given by the product of two factors: one 
being the probability of still being a member of the firm and the other 
being the person's share of work and benefits then divided by the corres-
ponding share now. If the person expects to be with the firm then with 
probability close to one and if on the other hand he or she expects the 
number of workers to be shrinking through time, then the discounting 
bias factor is greater than unity, i.e. the person opts for a lower discount-
ing rate for the firm than corresponds to his personal preferences. This 
case is, of course, an unlikely case. Indeed, obviously the average dis-
counting bias factor in a firm can never be greater than unity, if expec-
tation about personally leaving the firm and expectation about the size 
of the firm's membership are consistent. 
Let us therefore concentrate on the problem of sufficient immobility. We 
define the subjective mobility expectation rate (or simply the mobility 
rate), Q, to be the negative value of the percentage rate of change of the 
discounting bias factor with a unit change of the future date to which it 
refers. In other words if n (T) is the subjective probability of still being 62  E. Schlicht and C. C. von Weizsäcker 
with the firm at future date T and if a (T) is the expected size of the mem-
bership of the firm at future date r, then 
d log 7i (T) d log a (T) 
Q T = - 1 -
d T d z 
Many interesting voting problems can (and should) be discussed using 
these concepts. Let us for this paper concentrate on the very simplified 
case that people are "Markovian" in the sense that they consider g (T) 
to be a constant independent of r. In a Markovian labour managed 
economy, which has a constant labour force, the parameter g, if consistent 
with observed behaviour, simply reflects actual mobility behaviour in the 
sense that within a small interval A r, 1000 • gAr out of 1000 people will 
have left their firm. Thus there is a close connection between the concept 
we use and easily observable phenomena of actual mobility behaviour. 
9. The Demand for Mobility as a Function 
of Mobility Costs 
We now have to investigate demand for mobility and supply of mobi-
lity. By demand for mobility we mean a person's wish to change Jobs, 
by supply of mobility we mean job offerings of firms to people in the 
labour market outside the own firm. There exists, as is well known, 
potentially substantial mobility or moving costs in any kind of economic 
system. The costs are shared by the employee, Iiis former and his new 
employer. The costs may comprise literal moving costs, but this is fre-
quently a minor part of all the costs. The acquisition of specific know-
ledge and skill, the risks involved for employers and employees etc. are 
also part of these costs. The topic has drawn much attention from econo-
mists in recent years, and one kind of costs specifically stressed by econo-
mists has been search costs for new Jobs or for new employees. What-
ever the costs are, and whoever bears these costs the mobility of the 
labour force will fall as these costs rise. 
In a stationary steady State of a labour managed economy it is appro-
priate to say that the rate of supply ofadditional vacant Jobs in any given 
period is just equal to the rate at which these vacancies are created by 
people leaving their Jobs. Since people by the Constitution of the system 
cannot be fired, the number of quits by employees (including retirement 
at retirement age or due to ill health) determines the mobility rate. 
Whoever bears the cost, the quits will be lower when the mobility costs 
are higher: even if the direct cost is borne by the former employer or the 
new employer this will be the case, because they will devise incentives 
not to move in accordance to the moving costs they have to bear. 
Let us then stipulate a functional relation g (c) between the mobility 
rate and the total moving cost per case, c, such that g' (c) < 0. Let us 
observe here that at the equilibrium firm size the moving costs are not 
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an incentive to reduce manpower below the Optimum firm size level, as 
discussed above. Thus at the Optimum firm size level a private cost or 
benefit of mobility exists, which has no social counterpart. But this is 
why the Optimum firm size is not the equilibrium firm size. At the equi-
librium firm size the labour managed firm has just as much an incentive 
to replace people who quit as does the capitalist firm. Therefore in equi-
librium, given the moving costs independent of the firm decision struc-
ture, the number of quits in both Systems will be the same (other things 
being equal). If the commitment mechanism in the labour managed 
system requires lower mobility of labour than in the capitalist system, 
this will have to be accomplished by higher mobility costs. 
10. Unemployment as an Immobility Factor 
Let us now observe that search costs - a large part of mobility costs -
are related to the unemployment rate. If unemployment is very low and 
many Jobs are vacant, search costs are quite high for firms; as unemploy-
ment rises and the number of vacant Jobs declines, search costs go down 
for firms and go up for workers. There exists probably a certain un-
employment Situation such that the sum of these search costs is a mini-
mum. We may call this the efficient unemployment rate. It is likely that 
a labour managed economy which has a problem of an insufficient 
commitment mechanism, will exhibit an equilibrium rate of unemploy-
ment which is above the efficient unemployment rate. Thus a mechanism 
by which to reduce mobility to appropriate levels is to increase un-
employment. Let u be the unemployment rate. Then we assume there 
exists a functional relation c (u), such that c' (u) < 0 for very small u 
and c' {u) > 0 for sufficiently large u. 
But why should unemployment be the correcting mechanism? The 
reason is the inherent aggravation of differences between profitable and 
unprofitable firms which an insufficient commitment mechanism implies. 
Remember that we argued: outward mobility of labour is negatively 
correlated with the firms' profitability. Unprofitable firms thus suffer 
most from the insufficient commitment mechanism. They deteriorate and 
at last collapse. Their members are unemployed - from a certain point 
onward they may prefer to be unemployed. To establish new firms is 
difficult because the risks for the financiers are high. Therefore, the insuf-
ficient commitment mechanism leads to higher unemployment. Thus we 
stipulate a functional relation u (Q) with u' (Q) > 0. 
The system of equations 
e = e (c) 
c = c (u) 
u = u (o) 
has a fixed point, if u (Q (C (W-O))) > for sufficiently small UQ and 
u (o (c (^o))) < UQ for sufficientty large u0, an assumption which we can 
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If ü is the efficient rate of unemployment we can define the commit-
ment mechanism as insufficient, whenever u (g (C (Ü))) > ü, so that the 
equilibrium unemployment rate is higher than the efficient one. A second 
equilibrium with u < ü is conceivable, but it is not of any practical 
interest, since it is dynamically unstable. Whether the equilibrium u > ü 
is dynamically stable depends on the particular dynamics of the system 
which we do not want to consider here. 
By a comparative static analysis we can easily see that a shift of the 
moving cost function in the upward direction will reduce the commitment 
problem. Indeed, let 
c(u) = f (u) + (X 
where a is some shift parameter. Differentiating the equilibrium with 
respect to a leads to 






It can easily be seen that ^ < 0 and ^ < 0: Since u' (p) > 0 (due 
J da da * 
to the third equation) both inequalities hold or neither hold. But if 
neither holds then aecording to the second equation (because in-equi-
dc 
librium /' (u) > 0) — > 0 and thus because of the first equation and 
da 
p' (c) < 0 we have ^ß- < 0, a contradiction. 
* da 
11. Other Immobility Mechanisms 
Therefore, whenever mobility costs are high for reasons which are in-
dependent from the commitment problem then an automatic commitment 
mechanism is provided for a labour managed economy. From this point 
of view it would be interesting to investigate carefully the discernible 
historical development of mobility costs. It would also be interesting to 
make a more detailed study of the precise quantitative relation between 
any given mobility level and the rationality of intertemporal decision 
making in a demoeratie production team. Outcome of these studies might 
support or refute a conjecture that labour managed organizations have 
greater potential in the future than they had in the past. 
If greater mobility costs improve the decision process in a labour 
managed market economy, then the device of artificially raising mobility 
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possibilities come to mind. The government could impose a mobility tax. 
For reasons which we do not want to discuss in detail we believe that the 
social psychology of labour managed economies makes it difficult to 
impose such a tax. Another more likely development is that income 
shares of workers become an increasing function of the time they belong 
to the firm (firm specific seniority premium) and this even beyond the 
point which could be explained by corresponding productivity differen-
ces. If outside financing is important, the rating of a firm and of its deci-
sion mechanism in the capital market will depend on the firm specific 
seniority premium. Thus pressure is exerted to develop these artificial 
mobility costs. They are certainly a good remedy for unemployment: it 
now becomes lucrative to hire new workers who get an income below 
their expected contribution to the Joint surplus. 
In the context which we discuss a fair comparison between capitalist 
and labour managed market economies must notice that psychic mobility 
costs may differ substantially in the two Systems. A worker doing a job 
simply for the money he earns may not care whether to work for his 
present or for some other employer. A worker who is part of a well 
functioning labour managed firm may consider if he wants to leave a 
Community to which he is strongly attached. The price, for which he is 
prepared to leave may be high. Thus his immobility may be high precisely 
because his firm has attractive properties which a capitalist firm does 
not provide. Thus the commitment mechanism in a labour managed 
firm may be a degree of firm patriotism which an employee of a capitalist 
firm is unlikely to develop. Whether partieipatory demoeraey as an 
Organization and decision principle is able to develop a high degree of 
moral commitment to be used as a sufficient commitment mechanism, 
this is an unsettled question. But it is plausible that those tend to answer 
it in the affirmative, who believe that the capitalist Organization prin-
ciple is deficient in meeting common human needs for self-realization 
and participation and responsibility. 
12. Conclusion 
We believe it would be a mistaken approach trying to prove the su-
periority of one of the two Systems over the other on purely theoretical 
grounds. Both Systems have drawbacks and strong points if compared 
with the other. What is important and fruitful is a clear definition of the 
deep seated structural characteristics of the Systems so that a fair com-
parison becomes possible. The commitment principle for decision makers 
seems to be important if good decisions are to be made. Capitalism makes 
the commitment principle compatible with high mobility of workers and 
owners by easily transferable membership rights (tradable shares) and 
by the exclusion from decisions of those whose membership cannot be 
made easily transferable (the workers). A labour managed market 
economy makes the commitment principle compatible with labour 
management by reducing mobility. Is this a trade-off between worker 
autonomy and individual freedom? 
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Summary 
Labour managed firms face some serious problems with regard to the 
Provision of capital, especially of risk-bearing capital. These difficulties 
are discussed in the first part of the paper. Subsequently it is argued that 
these problems are rooted in the fact that the workers are insufficiently 
committed to the long run well-being of the labour managed firm, i.e. in 
the lacking of a sufficient commitment mechanism. An interchange of the 
röles which capital and labour play under capitalism would require trad-
able job rights, an arrangement which is not feasible. It is concluded 
therefrom that any workable labour managed economy needs a special 
commitment mechanism. A high rate of unemployment might serve for 
this purpose, or, more attractively, a reduction of labour mobility through 
appropriate incentives like seniority-dependent remuneration schemes. 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Arbeiterselbstverwaltung von Betrieben trifft auf einige ernste Pro-
bleme bei der Kapitalbeschaffung, insbesondere bei der Beschaffung von 
Risikokapital. Diese Schwierigkeiten werden im ersten Teil der Arbeit 
erläutert. Sie scheinen ihre Ursache darin zu haben, daß die Interessen 
der Arbeiter in zu geringem Ausmaß an das langfristige Wohl der Unter-
nehmung gebunden sind. Eine Vertauschung der Rollen, die Kapital und 
Arbeit im Kapitalismus spielen, würde erfordern, daß Arbeitsplätze von 
den Arbeitern erworben und verkauft werden können, ein Arrangement, 
das aus anderen Gründen nicht sinnvoll getroffen werden kann. Es wird 
deshalb gefolgert, daß jedes arbeitsfähige System der Arbeiterselbstver-
waltung eines speziellen Mechanismus bedarf, der die Interessen der Ar-
beiter an das langfristige Unternehmensinteresse bindet. Eine hohe Ar-
beitslosigkeit könnte diesen Zweck erfüllen oder aber, was wünschens-
werter erscheint, eine hohe Immobilität der Arbeit, wie sie etwa durch 
eine Entlohnung erreicht werden könnte, die an die Dauer der Betriebs-
zugehörigkeit geknüpft ist. 